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Introduction
Monopolistic competition has characteristics of both 
competition and monopoly. Similar to competition, monopo-
listic competition has many fi rms, and free exit and entry. 
Similar to monopoly, the products are differentiated and 
each company faces a downward sloping demand curve. 
Monopolistic competition refers to a market situation with 
a relatively large number of sellers offering similar and dif-
ferentiated products.
Food products are increasingly heterogeneous as fi rms 
are able to create and market branded products. As agri-
cultural fi rms turn to new branded product development to 
defend market share, Boland et al. (2012) suggest that many 
of these industries arguably resemble monopolistically com-
petitive industries. The subject of their study, prunes in the 
United States, is an example that is consistent with fi rms 
operating under monopolistic competition. There are several 
fi rms operating in the marketplace, there are no barriers to 
entry, prunes are sold as a successful brand, and demand 
curves are downward sloping.
According to Adam Smith (1776), the ‘invisible hand’ of 
the marketplace leads self-interested buyers and sellers in a 
market to maximise the total benefi t that society can derive 
from a market. But market failures can still happen. When a 
transaction between a buyer and a seller directly affects a third 
party, the effect is called an externality. Namely, an externality 
refers to the uncompensated impact of one person’s actions on 
the well-being of a bystander. It is a direct effect of the actions 
of one person or fi rm on the welfare of another person or fi rm, 
in a way that is not transmitted by market prices.
Externalities cause markets to be ineffi cient, and thus fail 
to maximise total surplus. In other words, negative externali-
ties cause the socially optimal quantity in a market to be less 
than the equilibrium quantity. On the other hand, positive 
externalities cause the socially optimal quantity in a market 
to be greater than the equilibrium quantity.
In this theoretical framework, we can say that the quan-
tity produced and consumed in the agricultural market equi-
librium is effi cient in the sense that it maximises the sum of 
producer and consumer surplus. However, if an agricultural 
fi rm contributes to air, land or water pollution (a negative 
externality), then the cost to society of producing agricultural 
products is larger than the cost to the producer. For each unit 
of agricultural output produced, the social cost includes the 
private costs of the producers plus the cost to those bystand-
ers adversely affected by the pollution.
The government can internalise an externality by impos-
ing a tax on the agricultural producer to reduce the equilib-
rium quantity to the socially desirable quantity. Internalising 
an externality involves altering incentives so that people take 
account of the external effects of their actions. When exter-
nalities are signifi cant and private solutions are not found, 
government may attempt to solve the problem through: (a) 
command and control policies (these usually take the form of 
regulations that forbid or require certain behaviours); and (b) 
market-based policies (government uses Pigovian taxes and 
subsidies to correct the effects of a negative externality). In 
other words, public policies for externalities are: (a) regula-
tion; (b) taxes and subsidies; (c) assign property rights; and 
(iv) pollution permits.
Linear analysis used in the theory of economic growth 
presumes an orderly periodicity that rarely occurs in an 
economy. In this sense, it is important to construct deter-
ministic, nonlinear economic dynamic models that elucidate 
irregular, unpredictable economic behaviour. Chaos theory is 
used to prove that erratic and chaotic fl uctuations can arise in 
completely deterministic models. Chaotic systems exhibit a 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions: seemingly insig-
nifi cant changes in the initial conditions can produce large 
differences in outcomes. This is very different from stable 
dynamic systems in which a small change in one variable 
produces a small and easily quantifi able systematic change. 
Thus chaos embodies three important principles: (a) extreme 
sensitivity to initial conditions; (b) cause and effect are not 
proportional; and (c) nonlinearity.
Chaos theory started with Lorenz’s (1963) discovery of 
complex dynamics arising from three nonlinear differential 
equations leading to turbulence in the weather system. Li 
and Yorke (1975) discovered that the simple logistic curve 
can exhibit very complex behaviour. Further, May (1976) 
described chaos in population biology. Chaos theory has 
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been applied in economics by Benhabib and Day (1981, 
1982), Day (1982, 1983, 1994), Grandmont (1985), Good-
win (1990), Medio (1993), Lorenz (1993) and Jablanovic 
(2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c), among many others. A num-
ber of nonlinear business cycle models use chaos theory to 
explain the complex motion of the economy.
The agricultural economics literature does not have any 
examples of the externalities analysis in an industry typi-
fi ed by monopolistic competition. The aim of this paper is 
to develop a theoretical framework of how externalities can 
infl uence long-run agricultural monopolistic competitor 
equilibrium. This is done by constructing a relatively simple 
chaotic long-run monopolistic competitor’s agricultural out-
put growth model that is capable of generating stable equi-
libria, cycles or chaos.
The model
In the model of the monopolistically competitive agricul-
tural fi rm take the inverse demand function:
 (1)
where P is the monopolistic competitor’s agricultural price; 
Q is the monopolistic competitor’s agricultural output; and a 
and b are coeffi cients of the inverse demand function.
Marginal revenue (line MR in Figure 1) is:
 (2)
where MR is marginal revenue; P is the monopolistic com-
petitor’s agricultural price; and e is the coeffi cient of the 
price elasticity of demand.
Further, suppose the quadratic marginal cost function for 
the monopolistically competitive agricultural fi rm is:
 (3)
where MC (curve MC in Figure 1) is marginal cost; Q is the 
monopolistic competitor’s agricultural output; and c, d and f 
are coeffi cients of the quadratic marginal cost function.
Because of the externality, the cost to society of producing 
an agricultural product is larger than the cost to the agricul-
tural producer. For each unit of agricultural output produced, 
the social cost includes the private costs of the agricultural 
producer plus the costs to those bystanders adversely affected 
by the water, land or air pollution. The marginal social costs 
take into account the external costs imposed on society by 
the producer. An agricultural producer would take the costs 
of pollution into account when deciding how much agricul-
tural product to supply because the Pigovian tax now makes 
him/her pay for these external costs.
It is supposed that the Pigovian tax is:
 (4)
where T is the Pigovian tax; Q is the agricultural output; and 
m is the Pigovian tax rate. In this sense, the marginal cost 
function for the agricultural monopolistic competitor is:
 (5)
where MC (curve MC1 in Figure 1) is the marginal cost; Q 
is the agricultural output; c, d and f are coeffi cients of the 
quadratic marginal private cost function; and m is the Pigo-
vian tax rate.
The long-run equilibrium of agricultural monopolisti-
cally competitive industry generates two equilibrium condi-
tions. Firstly, a monopolistic competitor maximises profi t 
by producing the quantity at which marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost. Thus the profi t-maximising condition is that:
 (6)
In an agricultural monopolistically competitive mar-
ket, price exceeds marginal cost because profi t maximisa-
tion requires marginal revenue to equal marginal cost and 
because the downward-sloping demand curve makes mar-
ginal revenue less than the price. Equivalently, equation (7) 
expresses price directly as a mark-up over marginal cost, i.e.:
 (7)
The second condition, price (P) equal to average cost 
(ATC):
 (8)
means that each agricultural fi rm in the industry is earning 
only a normal profi t. Economic profi t is zero and there is no 
economic loss.
In accordance with (7) and (8) we obtain (curve ATC in 
Figure 1):
 (9)
Further:
 (10)
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Figure 1: Long-run profi t maximisation and new long-run 
equilibrium of a monopolistically competitive agricultural fi rm and 
the new marginal cost curve which includes the Pigovian tax.
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i.e.:
 (11)
Substituting (7) and (8) in (11) gives (curve ATC1 in Fig-
ure 1):
 (12)
Substituting (1) in (12) gives:
 (13)
Firstly, it is supposed that a = 0 and c =0. By substitution 
one derives:
 (14)
Further, it is assumed that the long-run agricultural 
monopolistic competitor’s output is restricted by its maximal 
value in its time series. This premise requires a modifi cation 
of the growth law. Now, the long-run agricultural monopo-
listic competitor’s output growth rate depends on the current 
size of the long-run monopolistic competitor’s output, Q, rel-
ative to its maximal size in its time series Qm. We introduce 
q as q = Q/Qm. Thus q ranges between 0 and 1. Again we 
index q by t, i.e. write qt to refer to the size at time steps t = 
0, 1, 2, 3, ... Now the growth rate of the long-run agricultural 
monopolistic competitor’s output is measured as:
 (15)
This model given by equation (15) is called the logistic 
model. For most choices of α, b, d, f, m and e there is no 
explicit solution for (15). Namely, knowing α, b, d, f, m and 
e and measuring q0 would not suffi ce to predict qt for any 
point in time, as was previously possible. This is at the heart 
of the presence of chaos in deterministic feedback processes. 
Lorenz (1963) discovered this effect - the lack of predictabil-
ity in deterministic systems. Sensitive dependence on initial 
conditions is one of the central ingredients of what is called 
deterministic chaos.
This kind of difference equation (15) can lead to very 
interesting dynamic behaviour, such as cycles that repeat 
themselves every two or more periods, and even chaos, in 
which there is no apparent regularity in the behaviour of qt. 
This difference equation (15) will possess a chaotic region. 
Two properties of the chaotic solution are important: fi rstly, 
given a starting point q0 the solution is highly sensitive to 
variations of the parameters α, b, d, f, m and e; secondly, 
given the parameters α, b, d, f, m and e the solution is highly 
sensitive to variations of the initial point q0. In both cases the 
two solutions are for the fi rst few periods rather close to each 
other, but later on they behave in a chaotic manner.
The logistic equation
The logistic map is often cited as an example of how 
complex, chaotic behaviour can arise from very simple non-
linear dynamic equations. The logistic model was originally 
introduced as a demographic model by Pierre François Ver-
hulst. It is possible to show that iteration process (Figure 2) 
for the logistic equation:
 (16)
is equivalent to the iteration of growth model (15) when we 
use the following identifi cation:
 (17)
Using (15) and (17) we obtain:
On the other hand, using (15) and (16) we obtain:
Thus we have that iterating 
 is really 
the same as iterating  using 
 and .
It is important because the dynamic properties of the 
logistic equation (16) have been widely analysed (Li and 
Yorke, 1975; May, 1976).
It is obtained that:
(i) For parameter values 0 < π < 1 all solutions will 
converge to z = 0;
(ii) For 1 < π < 3.57 there exist fi xed points the number 
of which depends on π;
(iii) For 1 < π < 2 all solutions monotonically increase to 
z = (π – 1) / π;
(iv) For 2 < π < 3 fl uctuations will converge to 
z = (π – 1) / π;
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(v) For 3 < π < 4 all solutions will continuously fl uctuate;
(vi) For 3.57 < π < 4 the solution becomes ‘chaotic’ 
which means that there exist a totally aperiodic solu-
tion or periodic solutions with a very large, compli-
cated period. This means that the path of zt fl uctu-
ates in an apparently random fashion over time, not 
settling down into any regular pattern whatsoever.
Conclusion
This paper suggests the use of the simple chaotic model 
of a profi t maximising agricultural monopolistic competi-
tor in predicting the long-run fl uctuations of the agricultural 
monopolistic competitor’s output. The model (15) has to rely 
on specifi ed parameters α, b, d, f, m and e, and an initial 
value of the long-run monopolistic competitor’s output, q0. 
But even slight deviations from the values of these param-
eters and the initial value of the long-run agricultural monop-
olistic competitor’s output show the diffi culty of predicting a 
long-term behaviour of the long-run agricultural monopolis-
tic competitor’s output, q0. A key hypothesis of this work is
based on the idea that the coeffi cient 
plays a crucial role in explaining local stability of the long-
run agricultural monopolistic competitor’s output where d 
is the coeffi cient of the marginal cost function of the agri-
cultural monopolistic competitor; b is the coeffi cient of the 
inverse demand function; α is the growth coeffi cient of the 
average cost, m is the Pigovian tax rate and e is the coef-
fi cient of the price elasticity of demand. The quadratic form 
of the marginal cost function of the agricultural monopolis-
tic competitor is an important ingredient of the presented 
chaotic long-run monopolistic competitor’s output growth 
model (15).
zt (17)
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zt+1 = zt (1 – zt)
Figure 2: Two quadratic iterators running in phase are tightly 
coupled by the transformations indicated.
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